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Florida's Codification of the Rule Against
Perpetuities
BERNARD JOSEPH KRABACHER*
Florida recently codified the common law Rule Against Per-
petuities with seueral significant modifications. In discussing the
newly enacted statute, the author focuses his analysis on provi-
sions designed to validate interests which formerly failed under
the common law Rule. This examination exposes areas of particu-
lar ambiguity in the interstices between the common law Rule
and the statute. The article offers several salient insights to those
called upon to deal with or construe the new statute and provides
suggestions for legislative reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities
Described as "an elderly female clothed in the dress of a by-
gone period who obtrudes her personality into current affairs with
bursts of indecorous energy,"' the Rule Against Perpetuities has
bewildered judges and perplexed law students for decades. In re-
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 721, 725 (1952).
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sponse, the 1977 Florida Legislature has codified and modified the
Rule Against Perpetuities in order to "eliminate several undesirable
applications of the Rule at common law." 2
B. Purpose of the Common Law Rule
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities was originally de-
signed for a primarily agrarian society in order to further the mar-
ketability and development of land. The purpose of the Rule is to
prevent persons from taking property out of commerce, thereby ren-
dering it inalienable.3 The Rule, by invalidating interests which vest
too remotely, encourages the improvement of land by promoting its
marketability.' Ownership interests of less than fee simple absolute
are difficult to convey because the interests are of questionable du-
ration and may be subject to conditions or restrictions. Land which
tends to be inalienable also tends to be unimproved because its
subsequent sale may prove to be burdensome. By invalidating inter-
ests and removing restrictions on the sale of land, the improvement
of real estate becomes more attractive due to its increased marketa-
bility.
Ancillary to its original context, the Rule has also been applied
to the duration of private trusts, options and contracts for future
payments.5 The Rule is applied to these interests in order to prevent
persons from creating undue concentrations of wealth in the hands
of a few, by tying up property for generations. In addition, one
authority argues cogently that it is socially desirable for wealth to
be controlled by the living and not the dead.7
C. Failings of the Common Law Rule
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, however well con-
2. FLA. STAT. § 689.22 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979). The legislative intent was to codify
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities and, in addition, to eliminate several undesirable
applications of the Rule at common law. House Judiciary Committee Staff Summary, 1977
Florida Legislature.
3. House Judiciary Committee Staff Summary, 1977 Florida Legislature; J. GRAY, THE
RuLE AGAINST PERPETurrIEs 4 (4th ed. 1942); ABA LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK ON PERPETUrIES 5
(1958); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52
MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 (1953); see Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156
So. 101 (1934).
4. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 709 (1955).
5. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.56-.59 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as ALP].
6. Id. § 24.11; see L. SIMES, PuBuc PoucY AND THE DEAD HAND 57 (1955); Simes, supra
note 4, at 722; Leach, supra note 1, at 727. It has been suggested that the problem of undue
concentrations of wealth is best dealt with by the use of estate and gift taxes.
7. L. SImts, supra note 6, at 58.
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ceived, has failed to achieve consistent, sound results. This is due
to several factors.
First, the common law Rule is read to apply (with one excep-
tion)8 at the inception of the interest's creation with consideration
only of facts and circumstances in existence at that time? All possi-
bilities, however remote or unlikely, must be considered in deciding
whether the interest must vest or fail within the perpetuities period.
This gives rise to possibilities which may be foreclosed by actual or
highly improbable'0 events. Nevertheless, the common law Rule,
with its "remorseless"" application, continues to invalidate inter-
ests which could possibly vest beyond the period.
Second, any interest which violates the Rule is totally void ab
initio.'2 Furthermore, a prior valid interest, which standing alone
would not fulfill the grantor's intentions, may also be invalidated. 3
Since the courts cannot rewrite the instrument, some beneficiaries
may be completely denied a gift. Such a rigid, technical application
of the Rule does violence to the disposition. It is likely that most
grantors would prefer the court to partially rewrite the instrument
rather than have the interests fail in their entirety. 4
Third, possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry 5 are ex-
cepted from the Rule." Reverters and rights of re-entry hinder alien-
ability and discourage the improvement of property as much as
contingent remainders and executory interests. All create estates in
grantees which are less than fee simple absolute and which may be
subject to restrictions or conditions. There appears to be no valid
8. When determining the validity of appointments under special or general testamentary
powers of appointment, facts existing at the date of appointment may be taken into consider-
ation. 6 ALP § 24.35.
9. Id. § 24.24.
10. For some delightful yet improbable possibilities, see Leach, Perpetuities in a
Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. Rzv. 638, 643-44 (1938).
11. J. GaAY, supra note 3, at 599.
12. 6 ALP § 24.47.
13. This is commonly referred to as "infectious invalidity." Id. §§ 24.48-.52. The rule of
infectious invalidity is not a hard and fast rule and is only applied when the court concludes
that the grantor would rather have the whole instrument fail than have it partially validated.
Depending upon heirship, other gifts or interests created, and so forth, the grantor's purpose
might be more nearly accomplished by invalidating the entire instrument.
14. Courts, however, are in no position to rewrite all instruments. They are not acutely
aware of the considerations that determine the manner in which a grantor makes a certain
disposition. Therefore, the courts should not have unbridled discretion in rewriting instru-
ments.
15. Rights of re-entry are vested in the United States, 6 ALP § 24.62, but in England
they are not vested and, therefore, are subject to the Rule. Re Hollis' Hospital Trustees
[1899] 2 Ch. 540.
16. 6 ALP § 24.62.
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reason for the distinction. 7
Fourth, the common law Rule is concerned with the remoteness
of vesting," despite the fact that vested interests with enjoyment
delayed may be as objectionable as unvested interests. In both situ-
ations the alienability of the interest is severely restricted. Likewise,
improvement of the property is discouraged. To make the validity
of an interest turn on a metaphysical concept, such as vesting,
seems to exalt form over substance, especially where an interest is
subject to alternative constructions."
Reform of the common law Rule is not justified merely because
it arose nearly four centuries ago in an entirely different social order.
Rather, it is because the Rule reaches results which are inconsistent
and unsound that reform is not only justified but necessary." The
best approach, based on the experience of other jurisdictions,2' is not
to rewrite the Rule completely, but to adopt the common law with
such specific alterations and modifications as are necessary to deal
with the problems listed above.
The Florida Legislature has agreed that this is the best ap-
proach. It has, therefore, codified the common law Rule while enact-
ing a number of the modifications suggested by reformers.22
11. FLORIDA'S STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A. Modified "Wait and See" Provision
The statute begins with a restatement of the common law
17. Most jurisdictions which recognize this exception to the Rule limit the duration of
reverters and rights of re-entry to some specific number of years. See Note, Perpetuities
Reform: Approaches and Reproaches, 49 NoTa DAME LAW. 611, 627 (1974). Florida has
limited the duration of possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry created after July 1, 1951,
to 21 years. FLA. STAT. § 689.18(4) (1977).
18. Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 301, 28 So. 2d 890, 894 (1946); Story v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 443, 156 So. 101, 104 (1934); In re Will of Jones,. 289 So. 2d
42, 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
19. For example, a bequest "to the children of A (a living person) when they reach 25
years of age," could be construed as contingent upon the children reaching age 25 (and void
under the common law Rule), or vested with payment postponed until age 25 (valid under
the common law Rule). T. BERGEN & P. HASKLE, PREFAc E TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 217 (1966).
20. Recognizing the need for reform, many states have altered the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities. 6 ALP § 25.1 (1952 & Supp. 1976). The types of approaches used
include: reform by judicial decree, e.g., In re Bassett Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415
(1963), Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953), Edgerly v. Barker,
66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891); "wait and see" statutes, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4-
.5 (Purdon 1975); modified "wait and see" statutes, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184a, §§
1-6 (West 1977); and "cy pres" statutes, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §.501 (1975).
21. The difficulties inherent in rewriting the Rule Against Perpetuities are illustrated by
New York's experience. See generally 6 ALP § 25.6 (1952 & Supp. 1976).
22. See Simes, supra note 3.
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Rule 3 and then provides that the validity of the interest is to be
determined at the end of lives in being or after twenty-one years if
no lives in being are used. 4 This section alters the common law
approach which determined the validity of an interest at the time
of its creation. Under the statute, the interest is viewed in light of
facts which exist at the end of lives in being or after twenty-one
years if no lives in being are used.2" This is called a modified "wait
and see" statute." The statute will satisfactorily handle most ques-
tions which arise; however, several problems are created by the
"wait and see" doctrine, and the proper treatment of certain inter-
ests is unclear.
Under the common law Rule, the validity of a future interest
is certain from the outset; whereas during the "wait and see" period,
the interest's validity is uncertain. The uncertainty arises because
one must wait until the end of some life in being, or twenty-one
years, before the courts will determine whether the gift is valid. For
example, assume that in a private trust, the trustee is attempting
to embezzle the corpus. Under the common law Rule, the benefici-
ary of a contingent future interest may protect his future right by
proceeding with a court action. However, under the "wait and see"
doctrine, since the validity of the interest cannot be determined
until the end of lives in being, or twenty-one years, and may be
found void ab initio, there is nothing for the court to protect." A
solution would be for the legislature or courts to grant potential
beneficiaries standing to sue for protection of contingent future in-
terests.28
Another problem arising from the "wait and see" rule's period
23. STATEMENT OF THE RULE.-No interest in real or personal property
is valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after one or more lives
in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved. The
lives measuring the permissible period of vesting must not be so numerous or be
designated in such a manner as to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(1) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
24. BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALIDITY OF INTEREST.-(a) Except
as provided in sub-subparagraph (5)(d) 1.a, in determining whether an interest
violates the rule against perpetuities, the validity of the interest is determined on
the basis of facts existing at the end of the lives in being used to measure the
permissible period or, if no life in being is used, the facts existing at the end of
the 21 year period.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(a) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
25. Under a pure "wait and see" doctrine, the parties must wait until the interest vests
and then see if there are any lives in being which could validate the interest. Note, supra
note 17; e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4-.5 (Purdon 1975).
26. 1 R. Bovx, FLORiDA RxAL ESTATE TRNsAcTIoNs § 22.07 [2] [a], at 142 (Supp.
1977).
27. Simes, supra note 3, at 185-86.
28. Note, supra note 17, at 621.
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of uncertainty is the greater likelihood that the interest will be
rendered inalienable. At common law, a contingent future interest
holder knew from the outset whether the interest was valid and
could effect a disposition immediately."9 Under the new "wait and
see" doctrine, the validity is uncertain, and few people would be
willing to purchase an interest which may subsequently be invalida-
ted.
The statute fails to mention anything about the doctrine of
infectious invalidity,"0 and it is unclear whether the doctrine re-
mains in effect. Assuming the doctrine is still in effect," waiting
until the end of the life in being may result in the entire disposition
being invalidated. The property would then revert to the estate.
32 If
the residuary legatees of the estate are different than the beneficiar-
ies under the dispositive instrument, the property would have been
in the wrong hands all along. Under the common law Rule, however,
the residuary legatees could sue immediately and have the interests
declared void, thus lawfully obtaining the property without
"waiting to see." This anomalous state of affairs could be remedied
by the legislature or the courts expressly abrogating the doctrine of
infectious invalidity.
A major criticism of Florida's new "wait and see" provision is
that it fails to solve the problem of who are the "lives in being." The
statute provides that the validity of an interest is determined at the
"end of lives in being used to measure the permissible period. 3 3 The
lives measuring the permissible period appear to be the lives at
common law, since the "wait and see" provision refers directly to
the provision restating the common law Rule.34 The only limitation
is that the lives "not be so numerous or designated in such a manner
as to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult.31 5 Therefore,
the question of whom the lives in being shall be, for purposes of the
"wait and see" provision, remains unanswered.
Where the instrument expressly designates the lives in being,
29. Simes, supra note 3, at 188.
30. Infectious invalidity arises where an ultimate interest clearly violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities, and in order to uphold the grantor's intentions, the prior valid interests
must also be invalidated. 6 ALP § 24.48.
31. This may be a valid assumption based upon FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)1 (1977),
which is most logically construed as a saving clause leaving the common law Rule intact. See
text accompanying note 61 infra.
32. Note, supra note 17. The court may also decide that the property would descend as
intestate property, in which case the property may still have been in the wrong hands all
along.
33. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(a) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).




there is no problem; but if implied lives in being are utilized, the
answer is not easily ascertainable. They need not be named in the
instrument," nor need they be holders of prior interests. 7 They also
need not be persons taking any interest under the instrument."
There is no limit on their number as long as they are reasonably
ascertainable .3 As a practical matter, implied lives in being at com-
mon law are determined by searching for any life which could possi-
bly validate the interest."0 In other words, implied lives in being are
determined by utilizing any life as long as the interest must vest
within twenty-one years after the termination of that life."
The common law method of determining lives in being makes
the "wait and see" provision almost unworkable. Following the
common law approach of determining lives in being by finding a life
which will validate the interest, there is no need for a "wait and see"
doctrine because the interest is already valid at common law.2 If the
common law lives are not used, then the problem of which lives in
being are to be used remains unresolved.
This problem is best exemplified by a gift, "[t]o the grandchil-
dren of A." At common law, if A were dead, the implied lives in
being were A's children. This is because A's children will validate
the interest since the class gift must vest, if at all, upon the death
of the last child. Under these assumptions there is no need to wait
and see since the gift to the grandchildren is already valid under the
common law rule. If A were alive, however, his children could not
be the lives in being because the interest could possibly vest in a
grandchild of a yet unborn child of A. Since an afterborn child
would not be alive at the time of the gift or deed, A's children could
not be the lives in being. 3 Under the "wait and see" provision, the
question remains as to who are the lives in being. The statute im-
pliedly designates the lives in being as the common law lives," but
in this situation there are no common law lives. 5
36. Leach, supra note 10, at 641.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887 (1928); Leach, supra note 10, at 642.
40. Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives In Being? 81 L.Q. REv. 106 (1965); Maudsley,
Measuring Lives Under a System of Wait-and-See, 86 L.Q. REv. 357, 360-62 (1970).
41. Simes, supra note 3.
42. Maudsley, supra note 40, at 360-62; Note, supra note 17. This may also be true under
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)1 (1977). See text following note 61 infra.
43. Leach, supra note 10, at 641.
44. See notes 35 & 36 supra.
45, At common law and under the statute, A will be a relevant life in being. If, however,
we use A as the life in being for wait and see purposes, the gift's validity is determined upon
his death. Even if A had no more children after the testator's death, the gift must fail because
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The answer to this puzzle is at least as perplexing as the com-
mon law Rule itself. Some states, recognizing this difficulty, have
substituted lives in being causally related to the vesting or failure
of the interest rather than retaining traditional common law deter-
minations." Others have opted for a statutory list of permissible
lives in being. 7 Neither of these methods, however, solves all of the
problems nor eliminates unnecessary litigation. 8
The solutions must lie in careful draftsmanship. By expressly
designating whom the lives in being will be, the problem is elimi-
nated. However, express lives in being should be either sufficient in
number or of such an age that at the end of these lives, a court can
determine with certainty that the interest will vest within twenty-
one years. 9
B. Powers of Appointment
Under the common law, powers of appointment are classified
as general powers presently exercisable, 0 general testamentary pow-
ers5' and special powers of appointment.2 The common law Rule
operates in two ways. First, it can invalidate the power itself, so that
no appointment is possible. Second, if the power is valid, the Rule
can invalidate a particular appointment. 3 Florida's new Rule
Against Perpetuities alters only the second part of the operation of
the common law Rule. Since the statute refers to "every interest
created through the exercise . . . of a power of appointment,"', the
the children could have grandchildren more than 21 years after A's death, thus creating the
possibility that the gift may vest beyond a life in being, A, and 21 years.
46. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.215 (Baldwin 1972).
47. E.g., Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55 § 3(4)-(5).
48. Note, supra note 17.
49. This is because Florida's statute does not extend the perpetuities period; therefore,
the interest must vest within 21 years of the date on which the last life in being terminates.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(1) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
50. A general power presently exercisable may be exercised at any time and in favor of
any appointees, including the donee. 6 ALP § 24.30.
51. General testamentary powers may only be exercised through the donee's will and are
unrestricted as to possible appointees. Id.
52. Special powers are exercisable only in favor of a specified class of appointees, not
including the donee of the power. Id.
53. Id.
54. For the purpose of the rule against perpetuities, every interest created
through the exercise, by will, deed, or other instrument, of a power of appoint-
ment, irrespective of whether the power is limited or unlimited as to appointees,
the manner in which the power was created or may be exercised, or whether the
power was created before or after this section takes effect, is considered to have
been created at the time of the exercise, and not at the time of the creation, of
the power of appointment. No such interest is void because of the rule unless the
interest would be void had it been created at the date of the exercise of the power
[Vol. 32:1137
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validity of the power itself is governed by the common law Rule as
modified by the statute.55
The new Act does alter the common law method of determining
the validity of an appointment made under a valid power. Under the
new Rule, the validity of all appointments is measured from the
date the power is exercised.56 At common law, only appointments
of general powers presently exercisable were measured from the date
of appointment. 57 Under such a power, the donee may appoint him-
self at any time; therefore, these powers are the equivalent of abso-
lute ownership.58 The new Act is a generous liberalization of the
common law approach and should result in the validation of many
appointments which were invalid at common law.
The only limitation under the new provision is that no power
may be exercised so as to create a special power or general testamen-
tary power.59 This limitation is necessary in order to prevent prop-
erty from being tied up in one family forever. Without the limita-
tion, assume A leaves his estate to his son, B, for life, remainder to
such of B's issue as B shall by will appoint. B then exercises the
power by giving a life estate to his son, C, remainder to such of C's
issue as C shall by will appoint. C then exercises the power in the
same way and so on, ad infinitum. 0 The property would thus be tied
up in the family forever. The limitation in the new Act obviously
makes such a scheme impossible.
The new powers of appointment provision is a proper alteration
of the common law Rule insofar as appointments under a valid
power are concerned. A large area, however, is left untouched
since the validity of the power itself continues to be determined
under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as modified by
the statute. The "wait and see" provision should help to validate
some of these powers, but uncertainty during the waiting period
and questions regarding the proper method for determining lives
in being still leaves some unresolved problems.
of appointment otherwise than through the exercise of a power of appointment,
except that no power may be exercised so as to create another power, limited as
to appointees or as to the manner in which such second power may be exercised.
FA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(b) (1977) (effective Jan. 1, 1979)(emphasis added).
55. Therefore, a general power presently exercisable is valid only if the power vests in
the donee within the perpetuities period. 6 ALP § 24.31. General testamentary powers and
special powers of appointment are void if they may be exercised beyond the period of perpetu-
ities. Id. § 24.32.
56. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(b) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
57. 6 ALP § 24.33.
58. Id.
59. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(b) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
60. Leach, supra note 10, at 653 n.37.
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C. Exceptions to the Rule: Non-Applicability
1. INTERESTS VALID AT COMMON LAW OR EXCEPTED BY STATUTE
The new statutory Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to
"[a]ny disposition of property or interest therein, which disposi-
tion, as of the effective date of this section, does not violate, or is
exempted by statute from the operation of, the common law rule
against perpetuities."' This provision is sufficiently ambiguous to
be construed in two ways. First, the clause "as of the effective date
of this section" could be construed as a grandfather clause for those
interests created prior to the Act which do not violate the common
law Rule. In the alternative, the provision could be construed as a
saving clause, whereby those dispositions after January 1, 1979,
which would be valid at common law, do not fall under the "wait
and see" requirement.
Under the first construction, the validity of all interests not
falling under the grandfather clause must be determined under the
"wait and see" provision. Even when a disposition after January 1,
1979 creates a future interest which would be valid under the com-
mon law Rule, one must wait until the end of lives in being or
twenty-one years to determine its validity. Draftsmen, not wanting
to wait and see if an interest would be valid, could no longer rely
on what was valid at common law. Therefore, this construction
appears overly burdensome, especially in light of the problems in-
herent in the "wait and see" doctrine.2
Under the latter construction, the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities is left intact with reference to interests which do not
violate the Rule. Under this construction, the statute is simply nar-
rowing the number of possible violative interests. If a disposition
after January 1, 1979 would be valid at common law, then there is
no requirement to wait and see. The only time it would be necessary
to wait would be when an interest violates the common law Rule.
This seems to be the most logical construction of the new statutory
Rule since the "wait and see" provision applies only when
"determining whether an interest violates the rule." 3 In effect, this
means that a court could immediately determine whether an inter-
est would be valid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
If the interest violated the common law Rule, the court would then
wait until the end of lives in being or twenty-one years to see if the
interest must vest.
61. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)1 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
62. See text accompanying notes 27-49 supra.
63. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)1 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
[Vol. 32:11371146
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Under Florida law, the dispositions or interests which would
thus be excepted from the new Act include: charitable trusts of
indefinite duration and gifts from one charity to another on remote
contingencies;"4 perpetual care trusts for the maintenance of ceme-
taries;1" reservations;" vested interests; 7 and possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry."
2. POWERS OF TRUSTEES
Florida's new Act is not applicable to a broad range of powers
of trustees. Powers of a trustee to sell, lease, mortgage, administer,
or manage trust assets, and powers to appoint a successor are ex-
empted." Under common law in the United States, these powers are
generally not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. ° They are,
however, subject to the Rule in England,7 and since the English
view has been espoused by prominent American commentators, 2
the best approach is to expressly exempt the powers. Such powers
in trustees actually promote commerce and the alienability of prop-
erty because the trustee can sell and reinvest the trust assets with-
out restriction.
Furthermore, the new Rule exempts both mandatory powers of
trustees to distribute income and discretionary powers to distribute
principal to vested beneficiaries.73 Discretionary powers to allocate
income and principal among beneficiaries are also exempted. Es-
64. Pattillo v. Glenn, 150 Fla. 73, 7 So. 2d 328 (1942); Holsey v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank,
115 Fla. 604, 155 So. 821 (1934); Montgomery v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930); In
re Jones, 318 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
65. FLA. STAT. § 689.13 (1977).
66. Robinson v. Speer, 185 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
67. Reimer v. Smith, 105 Fla. 671, 142 So. 603 (1932).
68. 6 ALP § 24.62. Note that the duration of these interests, with some exceptions, are
limited in Florida to a period of 21 years. FLA. STAT. § 689.18(4) (1977).
69. The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to: "Powers of a trustee to sell,
lease, or mortgage property or which relate to the administration or management of trust
assets, including, without limitation, discretionary powers to determine which receipts con-
stitut principal and which receipts constitute income and powers to appoint a successor
trustee." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)2 (1977) (effective Jan. 1, 1979).
70. 6 ALP § 24.63.
71. J. MoaRs & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 13-18 (1956).
72. See J. GAv, supra note 3, at 477-80.
73. The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to: "Mandatory powers of a trustee
to distribute income, or discretionary powers of a trustee to distribute principal, prior to
termination of the trust, to a beneficiary having an interest in the principal, which interest
is irrevocably vested in quality and quantity." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)3 (1977) (effective
Jan. 1, 1979).
74. The Rule does not apply to: "Discretionary powers of a trustee to allocate income
and principal among beneficiaries, except that any exercise of such power after the expiration
of the period of the rule against perpetuities is void." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)4 (1977)(effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1979).
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sentially, these provisions provide that the trustee's powers will be
upheld so long as the trust is valid.75
No interest is deemed created for purposes of the new Rule as
long as the creator of the instrument has the power to revoke or to
transfer the entire ownership interest to himself." This is consistent
with the underlying rationale of the common law Rule, since the
creator always has the power to make himself the sole owner of the
property." The property is freely alienable and not burdened with
any restrictions or conditions. Therefore, these revocable instru-
ments should be exempted from the new Act.
3. LEASES
Under the traditional common law Rule, leases to commence
upon the completion of a shopping center or commitments to enter
into such leases could be held to violate the Rule7" because the
contingency may not occur within twenty-one years, and the lease
would not vest in possession until that time." This type of invalida-
tion hinders commercial flexibility and frustrates the policies un-
derlying the Rule. The Florida Legislature, recognizing this prob-
lem, has excepted leases commencing on the occurrence of a future
contingency (provided the term actually commences in possession
within forty years), as well as exempting commitments to enter into
leases or subleases.8s This is a sensible provision since the exceptions
apply to standard business practices involving the construction,
development, organization and financing of rental property.'
75. 1 R. BOYER, supra note 26, at 144.
76. The period of perpetuities does not commence to run in connection with
any disposition of property or interest therein, no instrument is considered to be
effective for purposes of the rule against perpetuities, and no interest or power is
considered to be created for purposes of the rule against perpetuities so long as,
under the instrument, the maker of the instrument has the power to revoke the
instrument or to transfer or direct transfer to himself of the entire legal and
equitable ownership of the property or interest therein.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(b) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
77. Leach, supra note 10, at 662-63.
78. Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 973, 979 (1965).
79. Note that executory interests do not have the capacity of vesting in interest before
they vest in possession. Leach, supra note 10, at 648. Therefore, the leaseholds must become
possessory within 21 years, since no lives in being are used.
80. The Rule does not apply to:
Leases to commence in the future or upon the happening of a future event,
but no such lease is valid unless the term thereof actually commences in posses-
sion within 40 years from the date of execution of the lease.
Commitments by a lessor to enter into a lease with a subtenant or with the
holder of a leasehold mortgage or commitments by a lessee or sublessee to enter
into a lease with the holder of a leasehold mortgage.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)5, 6 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).




The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of property
law and, as such, should have no application to contract law.8" But
when an option is specifically enforceable, an equitable property
interest subject to the Rule is created in the option holder.83 Under
Florida's new Act, options in gross, options in leases and preemptive
rights are excepted from the operation of the Rule. 4 Under the new
statute, however, options in gross are not valid for more than forty
years.85 As phrased, the provision is ambiguous, and two construc-
tions regarding preemptive rights in gross are possible. First, since
the statute specifically mentions only options in gross, a technical
construction would exclude preemptive rights in gross from the forty
year limitation. This is a strained construction at best, since at least
one Florida court has equated options and preemptive rights.88 Fur-
thermore, preemptive rights in gross, exercisable in perpetuity, re-
strain the alienation of land as much as perpetual options in gross. 7
A less technical and perhaps better construction of the language
would be to include preemptive rights under the term "options in
gross" and limit the validity of both to forty years.
The provision excluding options in leases from the new Rule is
entirely valid, but unnecessary as these interests have not been held
to be subject to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. s Unlike
options in gross, options in leases promote rather than hinder the
improvement of land. Lessees are encouraged to make improve-
ments when they know that full ownership can be obtained by exer-
cising the option. Since such options are a common commercial
device rarely exercised beyond the period of perpetuities, they
should be excepted from the new Rule.
82. Leach, supra note 10, at 660.
83. Id.
84. The Rule does not apply to: "Options to purchase in gross or in a lease or preemptive
rights in the nature of a right of first refusal, but no option in gross is valid for more than 40
years from the date of its creation." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)7 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
85. Id.
86. Blair v. Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) (dictum).
87. Options in gross hinder the development and alienation of land since the owner in
possession will not make improvements which can be taken away without compensation by
exercise of the option. Leach, supra note 10, at 661.
It is important to distinguish between options in gross and preemptive options in gross.
In a preemptive option in gross, the only question is whether the purchaser will be the
optionee (exercising his option) or another purchaser (if the optionee decides not to exercise
his option). While preemptive options in gross restrain the free alienation of property, the
extent to which they do so is not as significant as in the case of an option in gross.
88. Fonact Corp. v. Superior Apartments, Inc., 251 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971);
Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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D. Reduction of Age Contingency
Under the new Act, any interest which would be invalid be-
cause it depends upon a person reaching an age in excess of twenty-
one years will be reformed and the age contingency reduced to
twenty-one years.89 This is referred to as a limited cy pres doctrine
since the disposition is modified in order to validate the interest."0
This is a desirable provision since it divests the court of any discre-
tion that it would have under a full cy pres doctrine and specifically
delineates the extent of modification allowed.
There are, however, several problems with such a rigid formula.
First, when an age contingency is reduced, property is taken away
from the prior interest holder before the grantor intended.' Further-
more, the provision places the property into the hands of beneficiar-
ies before they may be ready to receive it." The provision is also
contrary to the creator's intent, since any age contingency in excess
of twenty-one years implies that the creator felt that the beneficiar-
ies were too young to receive the gift when they reached twenty-one.
A question which the new Act leaves unanswered is whether one
waits to determine if the gift vests before reducing age contingen-
cies, or whether the contingencies are reduced initially to determine
whether the gift would then satisfy the common law Rule. 3
Overall, these problems are relatively minor since this provision
solves the most common single cause of perpetuity violations.
Judging from the absence of litigation in jurisdictions where similar
provisions have been adopted, reduction of age contingencies is defi-
nitely desirable. 5
89. REDUCTION OF AGE CONTINGENCY.-If, except for this subsec-
tion, an interest in property would be invalid because it depends for its vesting
upon any person attaining or failing to attain age in excess of 21 years, the age
contingency is reduced to 21 years with respect to each person subject to the
contingency.
FtA. STAT. § 689.22(4) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
90. 1 R. BOYER, supra note 26, at 146.
91. J. GRAY, supra note 3, at 757-58.
92. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. Rxv.
683, 720 (1958).
93. Construing the Act as a whole, with its major modification of the common law Rule
being the "wait and see" provision, the reduction of an age contingency would seem to occur
only if necessary after waiting the appropriate period. For example, a gift "[t]o B for life
and then to his children who reach 30" would not vest in the children when they reach 21 (in
order to validate the gift under the new Act). Rather, B would enjoy the gift for his entire
life and upon his death if he had children less than nine years old, the age contingency would
then be reduced.
94. J. MORIS, supra note 73, at 54.
95. Id. A careful draftsman could avoid all of these problems by simply not providing
for any age contingencies greater than 21 in unborn beneficiaries.
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E. Rules of Construction
The new Perpetuities Act provides several rules of construction
which will govern unless the instrument's creator provides other-
wise." Draftsmen should be aware of the presumptions contained in
the new Act and should make appropriate provisions unless the
creator wishes the court to apply these rules.
1. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
The creator is presumed to have intended the interest to be
valid. 7 This is simply an extension of the common law practice of
favoring vested over contingent interests. Even Gray was in favor of
such a presumption where two alternative constructions of an inter-
est were possible." The Restatement of Property also supports this
notion by suggesting that interests be construed to avoid perpetuity
violations whenever possible." This extension of the common law is
wholly justified.' 0 By presuming that an interest is intended to be
valid, the courts may construe the interest so as to avoid possible
perpetuity violations.
2. PRESUMPTION OF SPOUSE IN BEING
This provision attempts to reverse the so-called "unborn
spouse" case where a gift is invalidated because the spouse was not
specifically named in the instrument. For example, suppose T cre-
ates a trust "[t]o pay income to A for life, then to pay income to
A's widow for life, and then to pay the principal to A's children then
living."'' Under the common law Rule, the gift to A's children is
invalid since A's widow could be born after the creation of the trust.
Hence, the gift to the children may vest beyond a life in being, A,
and twenty-one years.
96. "RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-Unless a contrary intent appears, the rules of
construction provided in this subsection govern with respect to any matter concerning the
rule against perpetuities." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
97. "It shall be presumed that the creator of an interest intended that the interest be
valid." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(a) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
98. J. GRAY, supra note 3, at 601-03.
99. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 375, Comment b (1944).
100. The presumption of validity embodied in the newly enacted § 689.22 may be viewed
as an implied abrogation of the doctrine of infectious invalidity. The doctrine assumes that
the testator would rather see the entire interest fail than have a prior interest stand alone. A
presumption of validity cuts sharply into any such assumption. Although the statute does
not provide for situations where both a valid and an invalid interest are conveyed by the same
instrument, its expressly stated preference of validity suggests that the valid interest would
not fail. However, when the testator has expressly provided that his intent is to have the
disposition stand or fail as a whole, the doctrine would seem to remain in effect.
101. Leach, supra note 10, at 644.
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Florida's new Act attempts to reverse this situation by presum-
ing that any person referred to in an instrument as the spouse of
another, is the spouse in being on the effective date of the instru-
ment.'"' In the above example, this would validate the gift of princi-
pal to A's children since the gift would vest, if at all, upon the deaths
of A and his wife.
The section as written, however, is less than clear since it seems
to validate the interest of the spouse. Not surprisingly, the section
has already been misconstrued. 103 While the section seemingly aims
to validate the interest of the spouse, the spouse's interest is always
valid, whether or not the spouse is in being on the effective date of
the instrument. The section should focus its attention on a gift
which is to vest (or fail) after the spouse's interest terminates. The
first part of this section should, therefore, be amended to read: "If,
except for this paragraph, an interest would be invalid because of
the possibility that the person to whom it is given, or the person
upon whom the interest is limited, may be a person not in being
. . . ." There will then be no question that the section is designed
to reverse the common law Rule which invalidated an interest fol-
lowing an interest to an "unborn spouse."'' 4
Note, however, this problem arises because of sloppy drafts-
manship. The "unborn spouse" case could be avoided altogether by
simply naming the particular spouse in the instrument.
102. If, except for this paragraph, an interest would be invalid because of the
possibility that the person to whom it is given or limited may be a person not in
being at the time of the creation of the estate, and such person is referred to in
the instrument creating the interest as the spouse of another without further
identification, it is presumed that such reference is to a person in being on the
effective date of the instrument.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(b) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
103. Amundsen, Florida's New Rule Against Perpetuities, Ch. 77-23, 9 THE FLORIDA
BAR, REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE, TRUST LAW SECTION 3, 9 (1978). In note 22 of the article, an
example of a gift "to my son for life, then to my son's widow" is used to illustrate the "unborn
spouse" case. The author states that the common law Rule invalidates the widow's interest.
This is true but for the wrong reasons. The son, in this example, cannot be a life in being
since the grantor may have other sons who are born subsequent to the effective date of the
instrument. Therefore, the widow's interest is invalid, not because the widow may not be the
son's present wife, but because the son is not a life in being. Had the gift been a testamen-
tary transfer, the grantor dying with only one son, the gift to both the son and the widow
would have been valid. In such a case, the widow's interest, whether she is born before or
after the effective date of the instrument, would be valid since it must vest, if at all, upon
the death of the son, who is a life in being.
104. If the courts were so inclined, the section as written could be construed as validating
the interest following an interest to an unnamed spouse. In order to do so, the phrase "if,
except for this paragraph, an interest could be invalid because of the possibility that the
person to whom it is . . .limited may be a person not in being" would have to be construed




At common law, gifts contingent upon the "probate of a will,"
"the appointment of a trustee" or "the payment of the estate's
debts" were invalid. Since under the common law Rule a remote
possibility existed that the contingency would not be resolved
within twenty-one years, the interests were void."'5 Under this provi-
sion it is presumed that the creator intended the contingency to
occur, if at all, within twenty-one years.'° The provision is obviously
justified since these contingencies rarely, if ever, take more than
twenty-one years to resolve. However, if the contingency does not
occur within twenty-one years, the interest will fail under the new
Rule since the presumption will be overcome by the facts.
4. CHILDBEARING CAPABILITIES
Where the validity of a disposition depends on the ability of a
person to have a child at some future time, several presumptions are
created. It is presumed that males can procreate at fourteen years
of age or older and that females can procreate between twelve and
fifty-five years of age.' Evidence may be introduced to establish
whether a person can have a child at the time in question,' but the
later occurrence of contradictory facts will not affect the original
determination.' This presumption is designed to overcome the irre-
buttable presumption of fertility established in a very early English
105. Leach, supra note 10, at 644-46.
106. If the duration or vesting of an interest is contingent upon the probate
of a will, the appointment of a fiduciary, the location of a distributee, the pay-
ment of debts, the sale of assets, the settlement of an estate, the determination
of questions relating to an estate or transfer tax, or the occurrence of any specified
contingency, it is presumed that the creator of such interest intended that the
contingency occur, if at all, within 21 years from the effective date of the instru-
ment creating the interest.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(c) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
107. If the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a person to
have a child at some future time, it is presumed, subject to subparagraph 2., that
a male can have a child at 14 years of age or older, but not younger than age 14,
and that a female can have a child at 12 years of age or older, but not older than
age 55 or younger than age 12. However, in the case of a living person, evidence
may be given to establish whether such person can have a child at the time in
question. The possibility that a person may have a child by adoption is disre-
garded.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(d)1 (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
108. "The possibility of having a child by adoption is disregarded." Id.
109. "A determination of validity of a disposition under the rule against perpetuities by
the application of this paragraph is not affected by the later occurrence of facts in contradi-
tion to the facts presumed or determined or the possibility of adoption disregarded under this
paragraph." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(d)l.a. (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
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case."' ° The provision is sound because the rather remote possibility
of conceiving children at an early or very advanced age has at times
invalidated otherwise valid gifts.'
The provision also provides that any possible invalidity not
affected by the presumptions embodied in this newly enacted sec-
tion shall be subject to the "wait and see" doctrine."' While this
may invite the same criticisms and problems inherent in the doc-
trine," the scheme is consistent with the overall theme of the Act.
This revision works to eliminate highly improbable possibilities and
to validate gifts which would otherwise fail.
F. Acquisition of Real Property by Foreign Trust
The new Act provides that for any foreign trust acquiring prop-
erty in Florida, the law in effect at the time of the acquisition
determines whether there is a violation of the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities."14 This provision is merely designed to provide uniformity as
well as predictability to all trusts which hold, or may hold, Florida
realty.
G. Trust with Transferable Certificates
The new Rule Against Perpetuities is not violated by trusts
with transferable certificates, provided the trust may be terminated
by the trustees, or beneficiaries holding a specified percentage of
interest in the trust."5 This provision relates to commercial invest-
110. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ex. 1787).
111. For an excellent example, see Leach, supra note 10, at 643.
112. "Any invalidity because of the ability of a person to have a child at some future
time shall be determined in accordance with paragraph (2)(a)." FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(d)l.b.
(1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
113. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
114. ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY BY FOREIGN TRUST.-If
real property situated in this state is acquired by a trust validly created under
the law of another jurisdiction, the law of this state in effect at the time of the
acquisition of such property determines whether there is a violation of the rule
against perpetuities or whether a direction for the accumulation of rents and
profits is valid.
FLA. STAT. § 689.22(6) (1977)(effective Jan. 1, 1979).
115. TRUST WITH TRANSFERABLE CERTIFICATES.-A trust with
transferable certificates, heretofore or hereafter created, is not invalid as violating
the rule against perpetuities, but such trust may continue for such time as is
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the trust was created if the instru-
ment creating the trust provides that the trust may be terminated at any time
by action of the trustees or by affirmative vote of the beneficiaries having a
specified percentage of interest in the trust. This section applies to an investment
trust, which is an unincorporated trust or association managed by trustees and
which does not hold any property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
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ment trusts and the right to receive income which is transferred with
the trust certificate. Since these are commercial devices designed to
facilitate specific business purposes of generally limited duration,
they should be exempted from the Rule. Furthermore, since the
trust is readily terminated and the trust certificates freely alienable,
the flow of commerce is promoted rather than hindered.
H1I. CONCLUSION
Florida's codification and modification of the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities properly effectuates the policies underlying the
Rule, while eliminating many of the anomalies of this esoteric con-
cept. If read with a little common sense, the new statute will satis-
factorily handle almost all perpetuities problems.
As noted by the late Professor Barton Leach and concurred in
by the principal draftsman of the new Act:"'
The technicalities of the Rule Against Perpetuities are well
known to the estate specialists who are found in the large law
firms which more often serve clients with large estates; these
specialists have less difficulty in avoiding the technicalities and
carrying out their clients' wishes. However, it is more difficult for
the general practitioner, who often serves the smaller property
owner, to keep abreast of the intricacies of the Rule against Per-
petuities while carrying on the many other types of law practice
in which he engages. This bill tends to put the non-specialist on
a par with the specialist and thereby to protect the small to
moderate property owner who consults the general practitioner. "7
its trade or business, and the beneficial ownership of which trust is evidenced by
transferable shares or by transferable certificates of beneficial interest which
shares or certificates are offered for sale to the public.
Id. § 689.22(7).
116. Statement by Henry A. Fenn, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, to the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary-Civil, in support of FLA. STAT. § 689.22 (Apr. 8, 1977).
Professor Fenn was quoting from a statement made by Professor Barton Leach of the Harvard
Law School in presenting a bill for statutory modification of the Rule to the Vermont Legisla-
ture in 1957.
117. Id. at 3-4.
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